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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. IN AN EFFORT TO MAKE THIS A "CLASS-1" CASE. THE 
HOSPITAL MAKES TWO ARGUMENTS. BOTH OF WHICH 
ARE FLAWED. THESE ARE THAT BAD WEATHER IS A 
"TEMPORARY CONDITION" SO ACCIDENTS DUE TO BAD 
WEATHER ARE "CLASS-1". IT ALSO ARGUES THAT THE 
HOSPITAL COULD NOT ANTICIPATE THAT THE 
RUBBERIZED THROW RUG IT HAD AT THE EXTERIOR 
ENTRY COULD BECOME DANGEROUS BEFORE IT WORE 
OUT. THEREFORE. THE HOSPITAL COULD NOT 
ANTICIPATE HARM AND HAD NO DUTY OF CARE TO 
GUARD AGAINST. PLAINTIFF RESPONDS THAT ALL 
WEATHER. GOOD AND BAD. IS TEMPORARY AND AS THE 
HOSPITAL'S MAT WAS LAID DOWN TO PROTECT 
INVITEES DURING BAD WEATHER. THIS IS BY DEFINITION 
A "CLASS-2" CASE AND. AS TO THE HOSPITAL'S SECOND 
ARGUMENT. THE WEAR OF AN EXTERIOR RUG IS NOT 
ONLY ANTICIPATABLE. IT IS INEVITABLE. SO THE 
HOSPITAL'S SECOND ARGUMENT IS SPECIOUS. 
2. SUBMITTING ARGUMENTS TO THE COURT NOT 
OBJECTIVELY FOUNDED IN FACT OR LAW. AS 
DEFENDANT DID IN THIS CASE AT THE TRIAL LEVEL AND 
AGAIN IN ITS PRESENT ANSWER BRIEF. JUSTIFY AN 
AWARD OF FEES AND COSTS TO THE ADVERSE PARTY-
BARNARD V. SUTLIFF. 846 P.2D 1229. 1235 (UTAH 1992). 
RULE 11 U.R.C.P.. GIFFEN V. R.W.L.. 913 P.2D 761 (UTAH 
APP. 1996). TAYLOR V. ESTATE OF TAYLOR. 770 P.2D 163 
(UTAH 1989). RIMENSBURGER V. RIMENSBURGER. 841 
P.2D 709 (UTAH 1992). TAYLOR V. HANSEN. 342 UTAH 
ADV. REP. 41 (MAY 1998). 
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RESPONSE TO HOSPITAL ARGUMENTS 
Plaintiff, Catherine Durborow, (Cathy) restates the Hospital's Arguments and then 
states her response to them. 
1. Standard of review. Correctness. Bonham v. Morgan. 788 
P.2d 497, 499 (Utah 1989) ("challenge to summary judgment 
presents for review conclusions of law only") 
RESPONSE TO NO. 1: 
This is an incorrect standard. Plaintiffs Brief, page 5 correctly 
states the standard of review of a summary judgment is to view 
the facts favorably to the adverse party, no deference is given 
the trial court's legal conclusions and a party to summary 
judgment who admits key facts is subject to adverse summary 
judgment. Winegar v. Fraerer corp., 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 
1991), Heglar Ranch Inc.v. Stillman. 619 P.2d 1390 (Utah 
1980). 
2. Defendant alleges in its answer that it could not foresee that 
the rubberized mat it purchased for safety in adverse weather 
would ever become unsafe for such use. 
(Defendant's brief pages 6, 12, 13, 14, 15). 
RESPONSE TO NO. 2: 
This is an untenable assertion. It is inevitable that such a mat 
would eventually wear to the point where it becomes unsafe 
for adverse weather use. Thus, as weather is inevitable, 
Defendant had, and breached, a duty to inspect the mat for 
adverse weather safety so that eventual unsafeness was not 
only foreseeable, its occurrence was certain and inevitable . 
3. Defendant argues as a central point of law that "Inherent 
danger and foreseeability remain essential elements of the 
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claim' in the second class of cases." (Defendant's Brief page 
14). 
RESPONSE TO NO. 3: 
Plaintiff accepts arguendo Defendant's legal argument 
because the appropriate facts argued by Defendant that 
similarly, "Plaintiff has presented no evidence of a reasonably 
foreseeable inherent danger. By merely placing a mat at its 
entry, the hospital could not reasonably have foreseen that the 
mat would be blown by the wind so as to knock a visitor down. 
Therefore, this is not a Class-2 case, and the Class-1 
requirement of notice of the danger applies." (Defendant Brief 
page 14) 
The reason Plaintiff accepts the hospital's legal arguments 
here, arguendo, is that the hospital's factual conclusion that 
having placed an exterior mat for bad weather safety means 
that the mat will last forever without ever becoming so light, 
limber or worn that it becomes unsafe. The argument that 
rubberized fabric will never wear, and that such wear cannot 
be possibly foreseen, is simply untrue. To the contrary, as the 
hospital knows, all fabrics wear out, so the only question is 
when. As a result, foreseeability of hazard is built in and the 
failure to protect invitees against the ultimate unsafeness 
makes this case patently a Class-2. This is precisely spelled 
out in Canfield. 
4. Submitting arguments to the court not founded in fact or law, 
as Defendant did in the trial court and again in its present 
answer, justify the award of fees and costs to the adverse 
party. 
RESPONSE TO NO. 4: 
The standard of review is different at trial and at appellate 
levels. The difference is based on a consistent central theme -
the purpose of a fee award. At the trial level attorneys 
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consciously misleading the court should be sanctioned in 
accordance with the philosophy of Rule 1 U.R.C.P. so that 
trials are handled speedily, justly and inexpensively, so 
deliberate conduct destructive of those purposes should not be 
tolerated. At the appellate level, the award of fees is much 
more guarded so as "not to have a chilling effect on the right 
of appeal." Barnard v. Sweetleaf. 846 P.D. 1229,1235 (Utah 
1992). Rule 11 U.R.C.P., Giffen v. R.W.L, 913 P.D. 761 (Utah 
A.P. 1996), Taylor v. Estate of Taylor. 770 P.D. 163 (Utah 
1989), Rimensburger v. Rimensburqer, 841 P.D. 709 (Utah 
1992). 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Cathy refers to the Hospital's Answer by its numbered pages as follows: 
PAGE 3. FOOTNOTE 1. The Hospital says". . . whether the mat flapped and 
tripped Plaintiff before she stepped on the mat, or flapped against her legs and caused her 
to fall after she stepped on the mat... is in question." 
The matter is not in question. 
There are three eye witnesses, Cathy and the two hospital visitors who saw her fall, 
Gregory Burr and Tamera Parker. They all agree the mat was flat when Cathy walked onto 
it, and then while she was on the mat, it flapped up hitting her shins, this stopping her legs 
while her body was moving forward, so that she fell forward onto her knees and hands 
(R. 167-172 for Burr. R. 173-178 for Parker). 
Cathy touches on this point only so that there is no confusion as to the cause of her 
fall. 
PAGE 3. Cathy accepts the Hospital's statement as to the mat's testing, purpose, 
inspection, and post installation inspection because it is the Hospital's own words and is 
determinative of the applicable law. The Hospital states, 
"The doormat on which Plaintiff fell was a standard commercial-grade 
mat, four feet by thirteen feet, made of indoor/outdoor carpet with rubberized 
backing to avoid slippage. It was manufactured by the 3-M Company for 
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both indoor and outdoor use. The primary consideration in purchasing the 
mat was safety. The vendor demonstrated the stability of the mat by placing 
blowers at its edge and running wheelchairs over it to show that it would not 
blow or slide. The mat was designed and intended to be of sufficient length 
to allow enough steps for visitors' shoes to be cleaned of dirt and water 
before entering the hospital, for sanitation as well as safety. As an added 
precaution, another mat of the same type was also used inside the hospital 
entrance on the tile floor. This standard mat was also used at other 
hospitals in the area. This mat was sold to the hospital in 1990, with a useful 
life of eight to ten years. During the five years it was in use prior to Plaintiff's 
fall, the hospital conducted regular monthly inspections of the mat and 
surrounding premises, as part of normal risk management procedures, to 
look for damaged carpet or tile or any dangerous condition that could cause 
an accident. No such danger was ever observed or reported." (Deposition 
of Idella Warren 4-20, R. 160-64; First Affidavit of Ann Anderson, fflj 3-6, R. 
28-29; Oral Findings, R. 251-52.) 
The reader is asked to note that the hospital has conceded that: 
1. The mat was purchased for use in bad weather. It was not needed in 
good weather. 
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2. The mat was tested for suitability in bad, windy weather by putting 
blowers at its edge to see if it would lift, and it did not when new. 
3. The mat was made of rubberized fabric. 
4. The mat had an expected useful life of eight to ten years and, Cathy's 
fall occurred when the mat had been down five years. 
5. After the mat was installed, it was observed during the hospital's 
monthly inspections. 
What is important is that the hospital acknowledges that even though the mat 
was a bad weather mat and, as shown by its testing when it purchased the mat, the hazard 
the mat posed was that it might move in bad or windy weather. Notwithstanding thjs the 
hospital never inspected the mat during a storm, and never put blowers beside it to see 
if it would move in wind at anytime after the initial purchase. 
6. The Hospital says, "This mat was sold to the hospital in 1990, with a 
useful life of eight-ten years." (Answer Page 4, top paragraph). 
It should be noted that the Hospital makes no claim that there was a written 
guarantee for this life expectancy. Instead, the expected useful life was simply a 
salesman's statement made to induce a sale. Its actual life expectancy might have been 
less. With that, in five full years, a wind or bad weather inspection of the mat was never 
made. The Hospital only made "regular monthly inspections" which involved the entire 
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hospital and grounds, so the mat was a minute factor. The Hospital does not claim any 
specific inspection of the mat itself. Had it done so, it would have seen the mat was 
flexible well before it hurt Cathy. 
It is also to be noted that by the failure to inspect, hospital personnel never 
considered the question of whether the mat might become unsafe before it wore out. 
Concerning Defendant's original motion to dismiss based on Act of God, the 
hospital submits no fact justifying in any way its summary judgment motion on that basis 
(Answer Page 4 -5). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
1. IN AN EFFORT TO MAKE THIS A "CLASS-1" CASE. THE 
HOSPITAL MAKES TWO ARGUMENTS. BOTH OF WHICH 
ARE FLAWED. THESE ARE THAT BAD WEATHER IS A 
"TEMPORARY CONDITION" SO ACCIDENTS DUE TO BAD 
WEATHER ARE "CLASS-1". IT ALSO ARGUES THAT THE 
HOSPITAL COULD NOT ANTICIPATE THAT THE 
RUBBERIZED THROW RUG IT HAD AT THE EXTERIOR 
ENTRY COULD BECOME DANGEROUS BEFORE IT WORE 
OUT. THEREFORE. THE HOSPITAL COULD NOT 
ANTICIPATE HARM AND HAD NO DUTY OF CARE TO 
GUARD AGAINST. PLAINTIFF RESPONDS THAT ALL 
WEATHER. GOOD AND BAD. IS TEMPORARY AND AS THE 
HOSPITAL'S MAT WAS LAID DOWN TO PROTECT 
INVITEES DURING BAD WEATHER. THIS IS BY DEFINITION 
A "CLASS-2" CASE AND. AS TO THE HOSPITAL'S SECOND 
ARGUMENT. THE WEAR OF AN EXTERIOR RUG IS NOT 
ONLY ANTICIPATABLE. IT IS INEVITABLE. SO THE 
HOSPITAL'S SECOND ARGUMENT IS SPECIOUS. 
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The parties' briefs agree on all essential facts. 
The disagreement is in the logical conclusions to be drawn from those facts. 
Accordingly, Plaintiff restates the facts for the purpose of clarifying, and justifying 
the appropriate conclusions. 
Defendant admits that it purchased a rubberized fabric mat for exterior use at the 
main entry to its building, that the mat was intended for bad weather safety by giving 
invitees entering the hospital non-slip footing and by removing water from their shoes so 
the interior of the hospital floor would not become wet and slick. Having purchased the 
mat a full five years before Plaintiffs accident, Defendant claims that it inspected the mat 
as part of its monthly general inspections of the premises for safety. 
Defendant admits that it never inspected the mat for safety in adverse weather. 
Also, when Defendant purchased the mat, it placed powerful fans along side the mat 
to see if it would lift in wind. At that time it did not lift. Having established a means of 
determining bad weather suitability of the mat, the hospital never again used fans, or any 
other device, to see if the mat was still safe when the wind was blowing. (Defendant's Brief 
Page 3) 
From the above facts, Defendant argues that it was entirely unforeseeable that the 
mat would ever become unsafe in bad weather and as a result, because wear was not 
11 
foreseeable, it had no duty to inspect and having no duty, had no responsibility for the 
permanent piece of equipment it had installed on its premises causing harm. 
Stripped to its bare bones, Defendant's assertion is that a rubberized fabric is 
eternally safe, even though used continuously in good weather and bad for five years. 
Defendant's factual conclusion that rubberized fabric will never become unsafe has 
to yield to the conclusion that a rubberized fabric, like any fabric, has to become worn and 
unsafe, the only question being when. 
As Defendant's factual position is patently wrong, Defendant's conclusion that it had 
no duty to foresee wear also fails. 
The Hospital rests its argument primarily on Martin v. Safeway Store, Inc., 565 P.2d 
1139 (Utah 1997). 
Martin does not support the hospital. 
Martin involves no discussion of the Class 1 and Class 2 host-invitee classifications. 
Martin is a case where the host is entitled to win on the facts, regardless of 
classifications. That may be why the classes were not referred to. 
In Martin, ice formed in winter, at night, long after the host store had closed. The 
fall was in the store's parking lot. The store's evidence was that it used extreme care in 
making the parking lot safe while the store was open. Based on those facts, the store had 
recognized potential danger and had done all it reasonably could to protect the invitees. 
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Safeway won because it recognized hazards due to weather and used full reasonable care 
to protect against them. 
Martin actually supports Cathy's position, not the Hospital's, because the hospital 
took no steps to make its entry safe in bad weather for the five years following its purchase 
of the mat. 
According to Canfield v. Albertsons. 841 P.2d 1224 (Utah App. 1992), there is no 
logical distinction between a situation in which the store owner directly creates the 
condition or defect and when the store owner's method of operation creates the situation. 
To be a Class 2, the risk has to arise from an instrumentality installed by the host (the 
exterior mat is concededly such an instrumentality), the instrumentality should be in control 
of the host (also conceded), and the instrumentality must be the cause of harm to the 
invitee, or the method of operation creates a situation where harm is reasonably 
foreseeable. Cathy has three witnesses to the cause of the accident. The Hospital has 
stated no facts in disagreement. (Read Hospital's Answer at Page 3., Footnote 1.). 
Why does the Hospital seek to make this a Class 1 case? 
The Answer lies in the burden of proof as applied to the duty of care. This is 
frequently determinative of host-invitee cases. 
When the dangerous condition is temporary and is not caused by an instrumentality 
controlled by the host, then it is usually a Class 1 case. Then, the invitee has the burden 
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of showing the host knew, or should have known in the exercise of reasonable care, the 
existence of the hazard and had the opportunity to remedy it. 
In the Class 2 case, Utah cases are consistent that the invitee really has no means 
of carrying the burden of proof because the host has control of the dangerous condition, 
the host installed it, so the host is imputed to have knowledge of the hazard created by the 
condition. The burden of proof then falls on the host to show that due care was used to 
protect the invitee from the hazard. 
If the host fails to meet that duty, it may be held liable on the basis that the invitee 
by establishing proof of a Class 2 case, has carried its burden of proof as far as it needs, 
so that a presumption of prima facie negligence is created, which requires the host to go 
forward with due care evidence in order to avoid an adverse verdict. 
Law on these points is stated in Cathy's original Brief. 
Accordingly, as there is no Utah case supporting the Hospital's effort to make this 
a Class 1 case, but to the contrary, every Utah case in point makes it a Class 2 case, the 
Hospital's effort to call this a Class 1 case fails entirely. 
The second point made by the Hospital is that this is a Class 1 case because wind 
is temporary. It cites DeWeese v. JC Penny Company, 297 P.2d 898 (Utah 1956) in 
support of this contention. 
The DeWeese holding is in fact exactly opposite to the Hospital's contention. 
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In DeWeese, a woman slipped because a terrazzo entryway, safe in dry weather 
but slick in wet weather, was slick during a snow storm. The host acknowledged its 
responsibility. Its defense was that the wet weather had just begun and it hadn't had the 
time to put out the safety mats that it used to protect invites from the slick terrazzo. That 
was a question of fact. Because the evidence was that it had been snowing for a 
considerable period of time, the jury verdict for the invitee was affirmed on appeal. 
The point of DeWeese, as opposed to the Hospital's contention, is very much on 
point with the case at bar. The mats in DeWeese were for bad weather. The mat in 
Durborow was for bad weather. The fact that bad weather is temporary made no 
difference in liability. The host was charged with the responsibility for bad weather safety 
of its invitee from conditions it self created, so the only question on bad weather is whether 
the host had the opportunity in the use of reasonable and due care, to respond 
appropriately. 
In DeWeese, the question was how long the weather had been bad. 
In Durborow, the Hospital's problem is that it had a mat that gradually became 
unwind worthy, but the hospital was ignorant of this because it never checked the mat to 
see if it was safe during a windy day. Thus, in Durborow the hospital never met the duty 
of care because it never checked its instrumentality to see if it was safe for the very 
conditions for which it was purchased. 
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In the Hospital's Answer at pages 1,6, 9,12,14 and 15 it makes the argument that 
wind is not foreseeable and it is temporary, and the fact that the mat would become unwind 
worthy before it was totally worn out was also unforeseeable, so accordingly no duty arose 
of expectable harm and, having no duty, it has no fault. 
The Hospital's argument is restated, above, simply because it falls of its own weight. 
It is simply untenable. 
The response is simple. Bad weather is foreseeable. Wear of an exterior "throw 
rug" is foreseeable. (The term "throw rug" is used because mats and rugs are either glued 
down, tacked down, or otherwise affixed, or they are thrown down, their safety depending 
on their weight and stiffness. In this context the exterior mat having been just thrown 
down, was a throw rug. Not being fixed to the ground, the hospital had to inspect to see 
if it remained sufficiently heavy and stiff that it would stay down in bad weather. The 
hospital admits it never made such an inspection. 
On these facts the law is clear. This is a Class-2 case. Harm was proximately 
caused by the Hospital's instrumentality. The Hospital failed to meet its duty to use 




SUBMITTING ARGUMENTS TO THE COURT NOT 
OBJECTIVELY FOUNDED IN FACT OR LAW, AS 
DEFENDANT DID IN THIS CASE AT THE TRIAL LEVEL AND 
AGAIN IN ITS PRESENT ANSWER BRIEF, JUSTIFY AN 
AWARD OF FEES AND COSTS TO THE ADVERSE PARTY. 
BARNARD V. SUTLIFF. 846 P.2D 1229, 1235 (UTAH 1992). 
RULE 11 U.R.C.P.. GIFFEN V. R.W.L. 913 P.2D 761 (UTAH 
APP. 1996), TAYLOR V. ESTATE OF TAYLOR. 770 P.2D 163 
(UTAH 1989), RIMENSBURGER V. RIMENSBURGER. 841 
P.2D 709 (UTAH 1992). TAYLOR V. HANSEN. 342 UTAH 
ADV. REP. 41 (MAY 1998). 
Cathy submits again that there is no Utah case of host-invitee slip and fall liability 
stronger than hers. 
She refers back to her original brief Argument, Points 1 and 2, with specific 
reference to the itemization of factors at page 27. 
Concerning fees, Cathy is troubled with the concept just restated in Taylor v. 
Hansen. 342 Utah ADV. Rep. 41 May (1998) supra, which states: 
"Regarding Hansen's request for attorney fees incurred on appeal, we 
note that although this Court is authorized under Rule 33 of the U.R.A.P. to 
award attorney fees on frivolous appeals, we impose such sanctions only in 
egregious cases less there be an improper chilling of the right to appeal 
erroneous lower Court decisions."' 
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In its Answer, the Hospital submitted the wrong standard of review on a summary 
judgment appeal, and it restated its factually unsupported and legally erroneous arguments 
that it could neither foresee bad weather nor wear of a throw rug. 
Whether this is sufficient on appeal to justify an award of fees is left to the Court 
because it is entirely legitimate that the standard for award of fees on appeal be much 
higher than in the Trial Court to avoid "chilling" the right of appeal. 
On the other hand, Cathy has had great delay and expense because the Trial Court 
was persuaded to accept the same arguments made here by the hospital. 
At the trial level, Rule 11, U.R.C.P. should be interpreted in accordance with the 
master rule of the Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The master rule is Rule 1, U.R.C.P. which provides that civil litigation should be 
handled in such a manner as to be speedy, just and inexpensive. 
For counsel to misclass a very simple set of facts into a wrong legal argument 
resulting in ungrounded summary judgment motions, carried to success through dint of 
persuasion, or lack of mastery of the topic by the Trial Court, is to greatly harm a civil 
litigant. 
This is inimical to Rule 1. 
Accordingly, Cathy leaves to this Court to determine whether fees and costs on 
appeal are proper, but says her right to fees and costs in resisting the Hospital's totally 
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unfounded motion for Act of God relief, and then its later motion miscasting the 
classifications and duties of hosts and invitees, clearly justify such a fee and cost award. 
Annexed as Addendum is Cathy's response to the Hospital's original Summary 
Judgment Motion, a motion based on the contention that the weather was so extreme as 
to constitute an "Act of God" which absolved the Hospital from responsibility. 
As the Hospital did not rebut either the facts or law stated in that Answer, the Trial 
Court had no choice but to deny that Motion. 
The Answer is in the Record at pages 37 - 46. The Hospital's Motion is in the 
Record at pages 22 - 27. 
Cathy annexed an affidavit of a meteorologist, Barry Nielson, that the strongest 
wind reported in the Salt Lake Valley that day classified as only a "strong breeze" under 
the Beaufort test. The only basis the Hospital had to claim as an "Act of God" wind 
strength was by putting in the affidavits of Mr. Burr and Ms. Parker the statements that it 
was the strongest gust of wind they had ever seen. 
The Hospital's attorney showed Mr. Burr and Ms. Parker the proposed affidavits 
prepared by those attorneys when they went out to their homes. Both objected to the use 
of that expression about the wind strength and they were both misled, being told that it 
was just a matter that could be taken care of later, and so at the request of Hospital 
counsel, they signed the affidavits. 
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This means that the Hospital had no evidence of an excessive wind and put the 
unjustified words in the mouths of the two eye-witnesses under their protests. 
That is an improper basis to acquire factual documentation in support of a motion 
intended to throw a litigant out of court without trial. 
The appropriate sanction is to award Cathy fees and costs for all time and expense 
incident to response to both of the Hospital's Summary Motions. 
CONCLUSION 
Cathy prays, as in her original Brief for an Order: 
1. An order setting aside Judge Iwasaki's Summary Judgment for Defendant. 
2. Finding that Plaintiff has established, as a matter of fact and law, negligence 
n the part of the hospital. 
3. Finding Plaintiff is entitled to her fees and costs for the motions before Judge 
Iwasaki and for this appeal. 
Respectfully submitted. 
DATED May Z$ . 1998. , / , 
yls^:'/-/ /<''jy t] 
Samuel King 
David J Friel 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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